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ABSTRACT
The purpose o f this study is to explore the divergent views concerning the proper
role o f religious convictions in moral-political justification. The basic question that
guides this research is how far are American citizens, religious leaders, and elected
officials properly guided in political choices based on religious convictions before they
are acting unconstitutionally?
Selected writings o f John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey served to
capture three moments in American intellectual history prior to World War Two. This
was followed by the consideration o f the divergent views o f moral-political philosophers
expressed in the last twenty years.
The most important resource used to explore this issue was contained in the
Supreme Court records involving obscenity law jurisprudence. The question was raised:
did religious convictions influence or inform the judge’s decisions?
The results suggest there exists a great diversity o f opinion among moral-political
philosophers and judges concerning the proper role of religious convictions in moralpolitical justification.

THE PROPER ROLE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTION
IN MORAL-POLITICAL DISCOURSE

Introduction
This paper will explore divergent views concerning the proper role of religious
convictions in moral-political justification. The basic question that guides this exposition
is how far are American citizens, religious leaders, and elected officials properly guided
in political choices based on religious convictions before they are acting
unconstitutionally? Or, to borrow the words of Michael Perry1,1 will discuss “the proper
relation o f a person’s moral beliefs [based on religious convictions] to her political
choices, and especially, to her public deliberation about her justification o f political
choices (3).” Put specifically, in a liberal democracy, is it proper to politically enforce
(by law) a person’s moral beliefs about what constitutes right action if those moral beliefs
are based primarily upon religious convictions? And I raise this question inside the
context of American histoiy and culture, our laws, our institutions, our communities, and
our form of government. How have Americans grappled with this question? What has
this meant in political philosophy, moral philosophy, in the laws o f the land, and in the
institutions that engender values and give meaning to life? This question brings together
several academic fields such as government, law, philosophy, and American intellectual
history. It is only one question among many that can be raised and explored inside the
classical ethical question: how ought we to order our lives together, a question too

1 Michael Perry recently served as Professor o f Law at the Northwestern University School o f Law and is
author o f Love and Power: The Role o f Religion and Morality in America (1991). His book defends a place
for religious conviction in moral-political discourse.
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expansive for the scope of this paper. In order to provide focus and tie several themes
together into a manageable and coherent thesis, I choose to focus on the proper role of
religious conviction in the formation of law. This is an admittedly narrow window to
gain some insight into the larger question: how ought we to order our lives together.
The organization of the paper begins with selected writings from John Locke, John
Stuart Mill, and John Dewey. I choose them to represent views that characterize three
moments in moral and political thought in American intellectual history before World
War Two. They will also serve to lay a foundation for turning to more recent writings by
moral and political philosophers. In chapter two I will consider the writings o f John
Rawls, Bruce Ackerman, Robert Audi, David Richards, Phillip Hammond and Thomas
Nagel. They will serve as a reference point for the family of liberal positions expressed
in the last thirty years. I borrow the term “family of liberal positions” from Nicholas
Wolterstorff who introduces it as a means of recognizing that the liberal position is
reflective o f a great range of perspectives and differences. For the purpose o f this paper,
the defining characteristic of the liberal position as it pertains to moral-political discourse
is the belief that religious convictions as a justification for coercive legislation should
properly be constrained, to varying degrees, from strict exclusion to inclusion within
narrow and specific qualifications. In chapter three I will explore those authors who
advocate a less constrained role for religious convictions in moral-political discourse. I
will discuss the arguments of Michael Perry, Kent Greenawalt, William Galston,
Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Michael Carter where they challenge the liberal position. And
finally, in chapter four I will turn to selected court cases involving obscenity laws to
ascertain, both implicitly and explicitly, the justification employed by judges to support
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or deny the constitutionality of obscenity laws. I will raise the question: did religious
convictions about how we ought to live together influence or inform the judges’
decisions?
This approach makes an assumption about the role o f the Supreme Court in American
moral-political discourse. I assume to some degree that laws reveal conflicts in society
and are indicative of tension rather than an expression o f commonly shared values and
beliefs. Alisdair MacIntyre2 argues that the “function of the Supreme Court must be to
keep peace between rival social groups adhering to rival and incompatible principles of
justice by displaying a fairness which consists in even-handedness in its adjudications
(253).” He further states, “The nature of any society... is not deciphered from its laws
alone, but from those understood as an index o f its conflicts (254).” I believe the court
cases involving obscenity laws will serve as a window to explore the conflict in
American culture, the diversity o f opinion surrounding the proper role o f religious
convictions in making laws, and an even greater diversity when raising the larger ethical
question: how ought we to order our lives in society.

2 Alisdair MacIntyre was Professor o f Philosophy at Vanderbilt University when After Virtue was
published in 1981. His book challenged the thesis that modernity possesses a commonly accepted ethical
paradigm “thick” enough to resolve tough moral-political issues. He later served as Professor of
Philosophy at Notre Dame and at Duke University.

Early Foundations in Moral-Political Philosophy
John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey made important contributions to the
historical development o f American intellectual, moral, and political history. I highlight
several themes in their writings, themes that focus on those fermenting principles of
liberalism that bear directly on the proper role of religious convictions in moral- political
discourse as follows: (1) the tension between protection o f individual freedom and
community welfare, (2) the lexical priority of individual rights set against community
interests, (3) separation o f church and state, (4) the argument for state neutrality on
conceptions and pursuit of the good, (5) scientific naturalism or rationalism defended as
the common language and authority o f public discourse, (6) coercive law justified on the
basis o f physical harm to others, and (7) morality severed from religious authority.
In his classic On Liberty, J.S. Mill3 writes about “the nature and limits of the power
which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual,” that is, the tension
between liberty and law, the need for effective government control contrasted with the
need to protect individuals against the tyranny of political rulers (5). He acknowledges
this inherent tension when he writes, “Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed,
by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the
operation o f law (9).” John Locke4 also recognizes this tension when he persuasively
defends comprehensive individual freedom and equality in his Second Treatise on

3 John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), published On Liberty in 1859, a classic text in the history o f political
thought and the subject o f sustained debate.
4 John Locke (1632-1704) represents the great heritage o f Enlightenment political philosophers who
elevated the value o f human individuality and influenced the establishment o f American Democracy.
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Government He argues that the legitimacy o f government is grounded upon the consent
o f the governed. Locke writes:
Men being... by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put
out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without
his consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of this natural
liberty... is by agreeing with other men to join and unite in community for
their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another (Locke
Second Treatise 52)
And yet, even as he defends individual freedom and the consent o f the governed, he
attempts to balance individual interests with community interests. He argues that “no
opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules necessary to the preservation
of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate... such things as undermine the
foundations o f society, and are therefore condemned by the judgment o f all mankind
(Locke Toleration 61).” John Dewey also sets parameters around individual freedom o f
action. He writes, “all men require moral sanctions in their conduct; the consent of their
kind... .No man ever lived with the exclusive approval of his own conscience (76).”
Locke, Mill, and Dewey are great defenders o f individual freedom of thought and action,
yet they each recognize an inherent tension between the limits of individual freedom and
community welfare.
Mill attempts to resolve this tension in two ways. First, he defends the lexical priority
of individual rights. And second, he appeals to the utilitarian “harm principle” as a
rational resolution to conflicting individual and community interests. He writes:
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty and action of any of their
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral, is not sufficient warrant... to justify [coercion], the conduct from
which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to

7

someone else.... Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual
is sovereign (13).” Emphasis mine.
Mill argues for the lexical priority of individual choice on matters o f conscience and
conduct. He defends this position on the utilitarian principle: “I regard utility as the
ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense,
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being (14).” Mill believes
that the greatest depth of personal happiness and fulfillment is achieved through the
exercise o f personal liberty and freedom, to choose for one’s self on issues o f belief,
conduct, conscience, and on concepts of the goal and purpose o f life. He defends the
protection of personal liberty as that which leads to the greatest aggregate happiness.
According to Mill, problems arise because of “the feeling in each person’s mind that
everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would
like to act (9).” He argues that rules of conduct must appeal to some reason accepted by
others. Personal preference and the “similar opinion o f others like minds” is not
sufficient justification (10). Mill argues that human liberty comprises:
First, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of
conscience, in the most comprehensive sense, absolute freedom of opinion
and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral or
theological.... Secondly, the principle [of liberty] requires liberty of tastes
and pursuits; of framing the plan of life to suit our own character; of doing
as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without
impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not
harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse,
or wrong (15).
Mill is concerned that majority opinion might usurp the freedom o f thought and action of
the individual. The following quote expresses this concern, a concern consistent with the
liberal position today.
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Protection, therefore, against the tyranny o f the magistrate is not enough:
there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion
and feeling; against the tendency o f society to impose by other means than
civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules o f conduct on those
who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent
the formation of individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel
all character to fashion themselves upon the model o f its own. There is a
limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual
independence. And to find that limit, and maintain it against
encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as
protection against political despotism... (8-9)”
Mill articulates in this statement a deep concern for the protection o f individual autonomy
against the imposed will o f the majority, the lexical priority o f individual rights set
against a majoritarian imposition o f the common good.
This same concern is absent in the writings of Locke, who seems amenable to a
community moral consensus, that is, rules o f conduct established by the majority. When
Locke defends freedom o f conscience, freedom o f religion, and the separation o f church
and state, he does not prescribe the same protection for freedom of action. As already
stated, he contends that “no opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules
necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate... such
things as undermine the foundations of society, and are therefore condemned by the
judgment of all mankind (Locke Toleration 61).” He argues:
A good life in which consists not the least of religion and true piety,
concerns also the civil government; and in it lies the safety both of men’s
souls and the common wealth. Moral actions belong therefore to the
jurisdiction both o f the outward and inward court; both of the civil and
domestic governor; I mean, both of the magistrate and the conscience
(Locke Toleration 56).
Locke defends the rule of the majority as a solution to the tension between individual and
community interest, a principle disputed by Mill. Locke states, “Whosoever therefore out
of the state o f nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all power,
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necessary to the management of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any
number greater than the majority (Locke Toleration 53).” This principle supports a
communitarian justification for legislation that is “for the good of the community,” a
position explicitly stated by some Supreme Court judges in the court cases we will be
considering later in this paper. In this context, the good o f the community is defined by
the majority opinion through a democratic voting process o f a given community, a
principle imminently detestable to Mill.
It can be argued that Locke’s conception o f a common good, interpreted in the context
of eighteenth century American culture, is greatly influenced by a religious worldview,
specifically, a Protestant worldview. This Mill finds unnecessarily oppressive and
constraining. Mill advocates a strong separation between religious conviction and state
coercion, believing religion is one o f the most powerful elements “which have entered
into the formation o f moral feeling, having almost always been governed either by the
ambition of hierarchy, seeking control over every department o f human conduct, or by
the spirit of Puritanism (16-17).” He argues persuasively from history that laws based on
religious conviction have been used to justify and violate individual rights in matters of
conscience and action. Mill certainly challenges a Christian notion o f morality as a basis
for justification in moral-political discourse, “That mankind owe a great deal to this
morality, and to its early teachers, I should be the last person to deny; but I do not scruple
to say o f it, that it is, in many important points, incomplete and one-sided, and that unless
ideas and feelings, not sanctioned by it, had contributed to the formation of European life
and character, human affairs would have been in a worse condition than they are now
(50).” This quote is in the context of an argument for freedom of thought and speech in
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which Mill challenges those who believe religious morality in general, and Christianity in
particular, is the whole truth for social norms and dissent is not to be tolerated on the
basis of the common good for society.
John Dewey5 introduces a separate argument to resolve the tension between individual
and community interests when he lays down some ethical principles in his essay on Art,
Science and Moral Progress. Consistent with Kantian thought, Dewey contends that
individuals should not be used as means to an end. They should not be sacrificed for the
good o f society. Instead, he believes democracy should create a social culture that
enables individuals to fully realize their “own personality” and potential in the state. He
defends the principle o f state neutrality on competing conceptions of the good. He
further believes that morality must be freed from absolute concepts of the good and
transcendent authority. Morality should submit to scientific methodology and social
experiment in which the right is defined as that which “works best” for individuals and
society, the “ought” defined instrumental and pragmatic and not as a means to one great
telos. The following quote from Dewey captures the essence o f this paradigm shift:
From this point o f view there is no separate body o f moral rules; no
separate system of moral powers; no separate subject matter of moral
knowledge, and hence no such thing as isolated ethical science. If the
business of morals is not to speculate upon man’s final end, and upon the
ultimate standards o f right, it is to utilize physiology, anthropology, and
psychology to discover all that can be discovered o f man, his organic
powers and propensities. If its business is not to search for the one
separate moral motive, it is to converge all the instrumentalities of the
social arts, o f law, education, economics and political science upon the
construction of intelligent methods of improving the common lot (73-74).
Dewey argues that ethics should be severed from religious authority. He rejects an
absolute, transcendent concept o f moral good that defines right and wrong. Instead he
5 John Dewey (1860-1952) was one o f the most influential moral-political philosophers in The United
States at the tum o f the 20th century and preceding World War Two.

11

appeals to science as the final arbitrator in moral-political discourse. Human experience
and scientific rationality becomes the common “authoritative” language o f public
discussion and excludes an appeal to religious myth and superstition.
John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey were each strong defenders of
individual rights, advocating comprehensive freedom of thought, conscience, expression,
and behavior for citizens independent of state control and coercion. Yet each recognized
an inherent tension between individual freedom and social welfare. Mill defended the
lexical priority of individual rights against the tyranny o f majority opinion expressed
through coercive state mechanism. He certainly challenged the concept o f a community
common good defined on the basis o f religious conviction. Dewey likewise challenged a
religious epistemology and argued that the good of society should be defined in the
common language of scientific rationalism and ethical pragmatism. The good of
individuals and society should be defined simply as that which best allows humanity to
flourish and fulfill their own potential. In contrast, Locke’s defense o f individual
freedom, especially in matters of religious belief, is firmly entrenched in a Protestant
morality. His defense of freedom of thought and conscience does not extend to actions
that violate a community moral consensus. He does not defend the lexical priority of
individual rights over majoritarian conceptions of the good, a good defined in eighteenth
century American culture and law by a Protestant majority.

The Family of Liberal Positions
Two o f the enduring foundational principles of liberalism are commitments to
individual freedom and equality. In liberal thought, only a limited government can be
justified; indeed, the basic task of government is to protect the equal liberty o f citizens.
According to Thomas Nagel6, the great challenge for the political theorist, one that has
never been sufficiently resolved, is to resolve conflicts between individual autonomy and
community responsibility: how to protect individual choice and freedom and at the same
time protect community interests (23). The relationship between religious conviction
and political choices bears directly on this tension. Robert Audi7 writes:
Religion and politics are perennial topics o f concern and debate in any free
society... especially in the United States. It is inevitable that reflective
religious people should discuss religion and that thoughtful citizens should
discuss politics. It is perhaps not inevitable, but it is altogether
appropriate, for a liberal democracy - a free and democratic society - in
which religion is a major cultural force to concern itself with the
relationship between religion and politics....It demands a good
understanding of the proper balance between, on the one hand, religious
commitments that bear on what sort o f society we shall have, and on the
other hand, political and secular considerations pertinent to the same range
objectives (Audi Religious Commitment ix)

6 Thomas Nagel is a law professor who recently taught at NYU. His book Equality and Partiality was
published in 1991.
Robert Audi is Charles J. Mach Distinguished Professor o f Philosophy at the University o f Nebraska,
Lincoln. His books include The Structure o f Justification (1993) and M oral Knowledge and Ethical
Character (1997). He has served as editor for the widely acclaimed Cambridge Dictionary o f Philosophy.
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He goes on to argue that one of the current challenges of democracy is “the delicate
problem of how a free and democratic society can achieve appropriate harmony between
religion and politics (Audi Religions Commitment 3).
o

Nancy Rosenblum recently served as editor on a book o f essays addressing the
tentative symbiotic relationship between religion and politics. She agues that the flurry
of current debate on this issue centers on three recent changes in our society: “an
explosion of religious pluralism; an increase in government activism effecting religious
associations - both coercive regulations and subsidies, benefits, and inducements; and the
prominence o f ‘integralism,’ or the push for a ‘religiously integrated existence’ (4).” She
describes the nature o f current debate when she writes that “Militant secularists fight to
keep religion out of political arenas and public coffers, and believers fight back, both
sides firing accusations and both sides claiming vulnerability (4).” John Rawls9
acknowledges this conflict between religion and democracy when he writes, “I have been
concerned with a torturing question in the contemporary world, namely: can democracy
and comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, be compatible? And if so, how?”
(Rawls Public Reasons 175)
A central tenet in the liberal position maintains that religious convictions should
“properly” be constrained in any attempt to resolve this tension. This chapter will
highlight seven key arguments from within the liberal position that seek to resolve the
tension between liberty and law while maintaining a “proper” constraint upon religious

8 Nancy Rosenblum is Henry Merrit Wriston Professor and Professor of Political Science at Brown
University. She is the editor o f Liberation and the Moral Life and was editor o f the book Obligations o f
Citizenship and Demands o f Faith (2000).
9 John Rawls is an American philosopher and political theorist. He earned his Ph.D. from Princeton and
taught at Princeton, Cornell, and MIT before becoming professor o f philosophy at Harvard (1962). His
book Theory o f Justice (1971) revived interest in systematic, normative political philosophy.
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conviction. It is important to note up front that the liberal position constitutes a range o f
perspectives. Robert Audi highlights the fact that the liberal position includes both a
“strong view” and a “weak view”. He writes, “a strong view requires that those reasons
[religious convictions] not be a determining factor at all [in moral political discourse]; a
weaker view would simply require that they not be the only determining factor (Audi
Religion in the Public Square 123).” Audi himself prefers the weaker view:
I propose that (particularly when advocating or supporting laws or public
policies that would restrict liberty) conscientious citizens have a prima
facie obligation to have and be willing to offer at least one secular reason
that is evidentially adequate and motivationally sufficient... there, then, is
one liberal position that provides reasons for more space for the operation
of religious reasons that one would expect from liberalism... (Audi
Religion in the public Square 123).
A common premise within the liberal position maintains that the religious diversity of
America precludes finding a common ground in moral-political discourse in
comprehensive religious doctrines. A second premise posits that a commitment to
individual freedom and constitutional integrity requires state neutrality on conceptions of
the good, particularly in regard to religious belief. A third premise argues that coercive
laws based upon religious convictions violate the establishment clause. This leads to a
critical question. If religious convictions cannot provide a common ground or a moral
foundation for coercive laws, how does the state legitimize any constraint upon
individual freedom and autonomy? Within the liberal positions, four common
paradigms are defended as legitimate solutions to the tension between liberty and law.
First, there is an attempt to establish a common ground in shared political principles.
Second, there is an appeal to a shared moral consensus. Third, some derivative of Mill’s
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harm principle is advocated. And fourth, there is an appeal to a common rationality and
reasons accessible to all.
Consistent with the family of liberal positions, John Rawls believes that the great
religious and philosophical diversity of American culture precludes a justificatory role in
moral-political debate for religion or other comprehensive doctrines. He states:
The political culture of a democratic society is always marked by a
diversity o f opposing and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and
moral doctrines. Some of them are perfectly reasonable, and this diversity
among reasonable doctrines political liberalism sees as the inevitable longrun result o f powers o f human reason at work within the background of
enduring free institutions (Rawls Political Liberalism 3-4).
Because o f the diverse and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines,
Rawls argues that a comprehensive doctrine cannot “secure the basis o f social unity, nor
can it provide the context of public reason on fundamental political questions (Political
Liberalism 134).”
Thomas Nagel presents a similar argument in his book, Equality and Partiality10. He
argues that moral-political theory' must seek a common ground distinct and separate from
religious belief because of the great religious diversity o f America. He writes, “the pure
ideal of political legitimacy is that the use of state power should be capable o f being
authorized by each citizen... through acceptance of the principles, institutions, and the
procedures of how that power will be used (8)”. Like Rawls, Nagle maintains that
religious belief cannot establish a comprehensive moral system adequate to resolve the
disputes o f law and society on how we ought to order our lives together. According to
Nagle, religious belief certainly cannot establish rules and principles for coercive laws
endorsed by all.
10 Equality and Partiality was published in 1991
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David Richards11 also defends this same position in his book Toleration and the
Constitution. He maintains that religious convictions must be separated from ethics in
moral-political debate. Like Rawls and Nagle, he argues that the religious diversity of
America makes this a necessity (127). Because of religious diversity, there is a need for
“a common ethical basis... an ethics of equal respect centering on all purpose general
goods (128).” He further states, “others should not exercise illegitimate control over or
compromise the ultimate responsibility of the persons for forming, expressing, and
revising personal conscience (133).” Richards’ advocates a conception o f universal
toleration that “must encompass all belief systems, religious and nonreligious, expressive
of moral powers of rationality and reasonableness.” He writes, “Our heritage of both
utilitarian and Kantian ethics maintains that our moral powers acknowledge
uncompromising ethical obligations independent o f God’s will (138).”
This leads to another important premise, state neutrality on conceptions o f the good.
Moral political theorist Bruce Ackerman12 strongly defends the principle of state
neutrality in his book Social Justice in the Liberal State. He argues that moral-political
debate should exclude all beliefs about the good, the right, and the fitting way to live life
that are not shared in common, a common ground established through a sifting process of
public debate. If individuals have different perceptions o f good and right, neither
perception can be justified as intrinsically superior to another, by the simple process of
elimination, only commonly shared moral premises are left standing. Ackerman argues,

11 David Richards is a law professor who recently taught at the New York University School of Law. He is
a career legal academic and author of Toleration and the Constitution (1986).
12 Bruce Ackerman is currently Sterling Professor o f Law at Yale University. Previously he was Charles
Keller Beekman Professor o f Law and Philosophy, Colombia (1982-87). His area o f expertise includes
Constitutional law and political/legal philosophy. Social Justice in the Liberal State was published in 1980.
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“liberal conversation provides a communal process that deepens each person’s claim to
autonomy at the same time it recognizes others as no less worthy of respect (347).” He
further argues that “it is the essence of liberalism to deny people the right to declare their
particular metaphysics and epistemology contains the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth (357).” He writes:
Nobody has the right to vindicate political authority by asserting a
privileged insight into the moral universe which is denied the rest o f us. A
power structure is illegitimate if it can be justified only through
conversation in which some person (or group) must assert he is (or they
are) the privileged moral authority.
Neutrality. No reason is a good reason if it requires the power
holder to assert:
a. that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by
any o f his fellow citizens, or
b. that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically
superior to one or more of his fellows (Ackerman 10-11).
Ackerman defends a neutral approach to political debate that begins in silence. He takes
as a philosophical starting point “there is no moral meaning hidden in the universe. All
there is is you and I struggling in a world that neither we, nor any other thing, created
(368).” This is clearly a worldview shaped by evolutionary theory and by naturalistic
assumptions about reality, “the way things really are,” a worldview rejected by many
American citizens. According to Ackerman, a liberal democracy “offers each citizen the
chance to achieve self-understanding without subordinating himself to meanings imposed
by others (231).” And the aim o f social justice in the liberal state is a community in
which “each is guaranteed the right to live his own life regardless of what his neighbors
think o f him (376).” Any limits to individual freedom are those limits free and equal
citizens would agree upon. In Ackerman’s paradigm for moral-political discourse,
neutral dialogue provides:
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A means by which citizen-statesman can resolve good-faith disagreements
without claiming the right to impose their idea of happiness on
another... each citizen’s judgment is worthy o f greater respect than the
view o f some transcendent being... So long as the rule can be justified
through neutral conversation, its legitimacy has been established within a
dialogic theory of legitimacy (319).
A third premise in the liberal position maintains that religious conviction as a sole
justification for coercive law violates the establishment clause. Richards argues, “others
should not exercise illegitimate control over or compromise the ultimate responsibility o f
the persons for forming, expressing, and revising personal conscience (133).” He
defends his thesis based on an expansive definition o f the First Amendment religious
clauses. He includes freedom o f conscience as a protected freedom: “the state must
guarantee and secure persons a greatest equal respect for rational and reasonable
capacities of persons themselves to originate, exercise, express, and change theories of
life and how to live well (136).” To defend his position, he turns to a critical historical
judicial decision: the United States v. Ballard13. In this case the court “rejected the truth
o f religious belief as a constitutionally valid criteria for state action (Richards 138).”
According to Richards, “the moral basis of the free exercise clause, properly understood,
is a negative liberty, immunizing from state coercion the exercise o f the conceptions of a
life well and ethically lived and expressions of mature person’s rational and reasonable
powers (140).” Richards turns once again to the Supreme Court. He states that there has
been a paradigm shift in the courts since World War II, “questioning the constitutionality
acceptability o f religion as a suitable proxy for the state’s promotion of appropriate
13 United States v. Ballard (1944) was a unique case. The Defendant was charged with mail fraud. Under
the guise o f religious belief, he solicited money through the mail for the promise o f divine healing. The
court did not focus on the veracity o f his religious beliefs, instead the court focused upon the defendant’s
willful intent to cheat and defraud others. I think Richards draws the wrong conclusion form this case. In
this unique historical situation involving Guy W. Ballard, the court decided the veracity o f Ballard’s
religious beliefs was immaterial to the charge o f fraud. Richard’s conclusion moves beyond the specific
historical situation o f this case to a wider application that is certainly debatable.
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neutral purposes for public morality... (249).” As a result, in the interpretation of law, the
link between religion and morality and religion and ethics has been severed and the
courts have shifted to a “neutral conception o f enforceable public morality (251),” tied to
M ill’s harm criteria and contractarian ideas o f democratic theory and practice.
Phillip Hammond14 in his essay Can Religion Be Religious in Public also argues, “The
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the use of governmental
authority to enforce religion’s authority (20).” Based on his interpretation o f the First
Amendment establishment clause, he argues that religious discourse must relinquish
public authority. By this he means that personal convictions based on religious
epistemology should not use governmental authority to legislate restrictive behavior. The
state should not lend its authority to prefer one conviction over another if that conviction
is based on religious authority (22). Central to his thesis, he believes that religious
conviction as a source o f moral authority for constraining behavior in society connotes an
establishment of a state-imposed religious belief, and thereby is a violation of church and
state under a broad definition of the establishment clause.
Any acceptance of the three premises presented thus far raises a critical question: if
religious convictions cannot provide a common ground or a moral foundation for
coercive laws, how does the state legitimize any constraint upon individual freedom and
autonomy?
Moral-political philosopher John Rawls seeks a common ground in moral-political
justification a step removed from moral premises based upon comprehensive doctrines,
religious or nonreligious, and philosophical first principles. He seeks a common ground a
14 Phillip Hammond is D. Mackenzie Brown Professor o f Religious Studies and Sociology at the University
o f California, Santa Barbara. His books include With Liberty for All (1998). He has been editor o f the
Journal fo r the Scientific Study o f Religion.
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step removed from questions concerning moral right and wrong and one’s understanding
of the proper and fitting way to live a good life. He argues that the reasons or the
justification for laws that constrain individual autonomy must be directly tied to the
values and principles of a liberal democracy and a reasonable conception of political
justice. He states:
When may citizens by their vote properly exercise their coercive political
power over one another when fundamental questions are at stake? Or in
the light of what principles and ideals must we exercise that power if our
doing so is to be justifiable to others as free and equal? To this question
political liberalism replies: our exercise of political power is proper and
hence justifiable only when exercised in accordance with a constitution the
essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in
light o f principles and ideas acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.
This is the liberal principle o f legitimacy. And since the exercise of
political power itself must be legitimate, the ideal of citizenship imposes a
moral, not a legal, duty - the duty o f civility - to be able to explain to one
another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies
they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of
public reason. This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others in
fair mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should
reasonable be made {Political Liberalism 217).
Rawls’s conception of a constitutional democracy maintains “citizens in domestic
society offer to cooperate on “fair” terms with other citizens {Public Reasons 25).” He
further expresses his political theory when he describes a constitutional democracy as “a
relationship of free and equal citizens who exercise ultimate political power as a
collective body {Public reasons 136).” He acknowledges that his conception of a
constitutional democracy is tied to “contract theory” as defended by such notable political
theorist as John Locke and Rousseau {Public reasons 13).
In a political system so understood, Rawls endeavors to find a common ground among
citizens with very different comprehensive doctrines, religious and nonreligious, that may
be irreconcilable. He argues that in a political system where citizens share equally in
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political power, each citizen must justify their moral premises in a manner that others can
endorse. In other words, in a political system founded upon the consent of the governed,
laws that restrain individual liberty must, to some degree, be justified to those so
governed, reasons understood and accepted by all.
Rawls argues that one element of “common ground” is the values and principles of a
liberal democracy or political values:
Examples of political values include those mentioned in the preamble of
the United States Constitution: a more perfect union, justice, domestic
tranquility, the common defense, the general welfare, and the blessings of
liberty to ourselves and our posterity. These include under them other
values: so, for example, under justice we also have equal basic liberties,
equality o f opportunity, ideals concerning the distribution of wealth (The
Law o f Peoples 144).
The second necessary component in establishing a common ground in public reasons
is a reasonable liberal political conception of justice. Rawls favors justice as fairness. I
mention only one of the key characteristics in a “reasonable liberal political conception of
justice” as used by Rawls: the criterion of reciprocity; “this criterion requires that, when
terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing
them must think it at least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens,
and not as dominated or manipulated or under pressure caused by an inferior political or
social position (The Law o f Peoples 14).”
Rawls argues that justification for moral-political discourse, especially laws that
constrain individual autonomy, must appeal to a common ground of political values
based on a liberal constitutional democracy and a reasonable concept of justice.
Public reasoning aims for public justification. We appeal to political
conceptions o f justice, and to ascertainable evidence and facts open to
public view, in order to reach conclusions about what we think are the
most reasonable political institutions and policies. Public reason is not
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simply valid reasoning, but argument addressed to others: it proceeds
correctly from premises we accept and think others could reasonably
accept to conclusions we think they could also reasonably accept {The
Law o f Peoples 155).
Like Rawls, Nagle attempts to establish fair rules and procedures o f government for a
free and equal people; however, he expands the parameters to include a common ground
based on a moral consensus. The paradigm Nagel defends is based upon Kantian
unanimity: the right result (in moral-political discourse) is achieved as different persons,
reasoning from different perspectives, converge on moral truth (34). His paradigm,
unlike Rawls, who seeks a common ground in the shared principles o f a liberal
democracy and common perceptions o f justice, looks for a common ground in shared
moral-premises. He develops a paradigm for moral-political discourse that places a
priority upon the “impersonal starting point: a starting point independent o f who we are
(Nagle 10).” According to Nagle:
Ethics and political theory begin when from the impersonal stand point we
focus on the raw data provided by individual desires, interests, projects,
attachments, allegiances, and plans o f life that define the personal points
of view o f the multitude o f distinct individuals, ourselves included... at
that point... we recognize some o f these things to have impersonal value
( 11).

In other words, commonly held values and moral-premises emerge from the sifting of
individual perspectives. This “common ground” o f shared values and perspectives serves
to establish unanimity for ethics and political theory and legitimizes a liberal democracy
embraced by consenting citizens. According to Nagle, the goal o f political theory simply
stated is to “justify a political system to everyone who is required to live under it... the
search for legitimacy is a search for unanimity - not about everything but with the
controlling framework within the more controversial decisions will be made (33).”
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Richards defends this same principle of overlapping moral consensus when he writes
about “our heritage of both utilitarian and Kantian Ethics ...(138). He ties this shared
moral consensus specifically to Mill’s harm principle:
(1) Acts may properly be made criminal only if they inflict harm on
assigned people. (2) Except to protect children, incompetents, and
backward peoples, it is never proper to criminalize an act solely on the
ground o f protecting harm to an agent. (3) It is never proper to criminalize
conduct solely because the mere thought of it gives offense (239).
Although Richards defends the harm principle as a justification for laws that constrain,
he rejects this principle based on a utilitarian ethic. He defers to Rawlsian contractarian
theory as superior. In contractarian terms:
Enforcement o f public morality must thus achieve two ends: first, it should
impose common standards o f minimal decency necessary to ensure
reasonable cooperation among peoples; and second, it should define those
standards in a way that respects the inalienable right to moral
independence, exercised in commitment to diverse and often competing
sub-communities. From this sort of contractarian perspective, an unjust
enforcement at large o f ethical standards o f one sectarian community infringing on interests central to the just moral independence of others - is
not an acceptable policy outcome in a liberal democracy.... Public power
must be limited to the pursuit o f the general goods that rational and
reasonable people would want protected... And when pursuit o f such
goods abridges essential moral interests (conscience, privacy), such a law
must be both necessary and indispensable to secure such goods, and do so
in the way least restrictive o f such interests (245).
Richards argues that the harm principle should be interpreted in the context o f
contractarian theory that protects general goods and Rawlsian principles of a liberal
democracy such as life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, equality, and privacy.
Robert Audi defends this same position in a 1993 San Diego Law Review article
entitled The Place o f Religious Argument. Audi argues that before behavior can be
constrained by force of law, it must violate the rights o f another person. He contends that
because a liberal democracy is a sociopolitical system that places high priority on
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protecting the autonomy of individuals, it should only pass laws that constrain behavior if
there is a clear scientific, empirical, cause and effect relationship between personal
behavior and harm to another person (Audi Religious Argument 690).
The relationship between evidence and personal harm introduces an additional
principle for resolving the tension between liberty and law, a principle that excludes
religious conviction as a sole justification for coercive law. A belief in an accepted form
o f reasoning or public rationality is a common theme in the family o f liberal positions.
According to Audi, religious convictions as a justification for law do not carry legislative
authority because by definition, their appeal to truth does not depend upon rational
standards accessible to all without reference to transcendent authority. An appeal to
science becomes the “acceptable” authority in moral-political debate:
If I am coerced on grounds that cannot motivate me, as a rational informed
person, to do the thing in question, I cannot come to identify with the deed
and will tend to resent having to do it. Even if the deed should be my
obligation, still where only esoteric knowledge - say, through revelation
that only the imitated experience - can show that it is, I will tend to resent
coercion. And it is part o f the under-lying rationale o f liberalism that we
should not have to feel this kind of resentment - that we give up autonomy
only where, no matter what our specific preferences or particular
worldview, we can be expected, given adequate rationality and sufficient
information, to see that we would have so acted on our own (Audi
Religious Argument 690).
Hammond expresses this same belief when he writes, “In the public square, religion must
advance its positions on empirical, rational, or logical grounds (30)”. Likewise,
Ackerman rejects transcendent belief as a legitimate epistemology; by default, scientific
methodology and rationality become the only acceptable “common language” o f moral
political debate (358).

25

Both Audi and Hammond argue that moral premises based upon religious convictions
are not legitimate in moral-political discourse until those premises are translated into
secular purposes, with specific public goods, with falsifiable justifications, and with
empirical evidence accessible to all, without an appeal to transcendent authority or
religious reasons as the sole basis for coercive law. Then and only then, can religious
arguments enter the public square as a justification for a moral premise in the moralpolitical justificatory process.
Consistent with Audi, Hammond, and Richards, Michael Perry15 defends as a general
rule that moral premises cannot be justified solely on the basis o f an appeal to truth or
authority that others would reject. To make his point, he quotes J. Bryan Hehir, principle
drafter o f the U.S. Catholic bishop’s 1983 letter on nuclear deterrence:
‘Religiously based insights, values and arguments at some point must be
rendered persuasive to the wider civic public. There is legitimacy to
proposing a sectarian argument within the confines of a religious
community, but it does violence to the fabric o f pluralism to expect
acceptance o f such an argument in the wider public arena. When a
religious moral claim will affect the wider public, it should be proposed in
a fashion which the public can evaluate, accept or reject on its own terms.
The [point]... is not to banish religious insight from public life [, but only
to] establish a test for the religious communities to meet; to probe our
commitments deeply and broadly enough that we can translate their best
insights to others’ (108).
To argue that child pornography is immoral based upon a religious conviction
violates the intent of this principle. To argue that child pornography presents a
possible psychological or physiological danger to children, or violates the liberal

15 Michael Perry recently served as Professor of Law at the Northwestern University School of Law and is
author o f Love and Power: The Role o f Religion and Morality in America (1991). His book defends a place
for religious conviction in moral-political discourse.
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principle o f equality, is consistent with this principle of speaking in terms others
can evaluate, accept, or reject.
A common premise within the family of liberal positions argues that religious
convictions cannot provide a common ground or a moral foundation for coercive laws.
Instead, four common paradigms are defended as legitimate solutions to the tension
between liberty and law. Rawls appeals to a common ground in shared political
principles. Nagle and Ackerman appeal to a shared moral consensus. Richards appeals to
a contratarian application o f Mill’s harm principle. And finally, Audi and Hammonds
appeal to scientific naturalism as the common rationality and political authority
accessible and acceptable to all.

A Challenge to the Liberal Position
The arguments presented that seek to resolve the tension between individual freedom
and legitimate state coercion independent and exclusive o f religious conviction are not
without their detractors. William A. Galston16, in his book Liberal Purposes: Goods,
Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State, attempts to defend the liberal position, but
with a specific nuance. He rejects “a pervasive theoretical understanding of liberalism as
neutral regarding human goods” and replaces “it with an alternative understanding of
liberalism in which specific goods and virtues figure centrally (42).” He provides a
critique o f the liberal position without being hostile to the basic tenets o f liberalism. He
attempts to combine consent o f the governed and protection o f the widest range of
individual freedom and conceptions o f the good, with those ‘Virtues” he argues are
necessary to allow the liberal state to flourish and survive now and in posterity. He is
concerned with the liberal culture in America: the apparent lack o f virtue and the signs of
social disintegration such as the break up of families, alarming violent crime statistics,
drug abuse, greed and the like (6). He argues that the liberal state depends upon cultural
capital, that is, the character o f its citizens: “liberalism is committed to equality, but it
needs excellence. It is committed to freedom, but it needs virtue (11).” He spends an
entire chapter o f his book advocating specific virtues such as individual responsibility,

16 William Galston is a professor at the University o f Maryland and Institute for Philosophy and Public
Policy (College Park, Maiyland).
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fidelity in family relationships, self-sacrifice, tolerance, respect for diversity; and work
place ethics such as initiative, drive, and determination (222-223).
He believes, “Policies that liberals typically defend as neutral are experienced by
many religious communities as hostile. Liberals see themselves as defenders o f our
constitutional faith, while many o f the religiously faithful see themselves as the victims
o f secular aggression (13).” He challenges the belief that an attempt to find common
ground in moral-political debate properly excludes a belief in transcendence. He argues
that debate on public policy and law should include “certain core notions to which the
overwhelming majority of a particular community subscribes and which help constitute
its special identity (24-25).”
Galston further argues that diversity does not in fact establish a common ground as
Rawls, Nagle and Ackerman anticipate, a common ground flexible enough to shape
public policy and a political system. The opposite may be the case. Reasonable people
may arrive at different conclusions concerning the fundamental principles of a shared
political culture. And reasonable people may possess very different conceptions o f social
justice. Galston states that liberalism based on neutrality fails because “no society is fully
universal; every society picks out some favored goals and ways of life while discouraging
or repressing others (30).” He further states, “Morality is in part local, particular,
community-based, historical; and reason may not be fully competent to resolve
contradictions among considerations relevant to the rational determination o f moral
judgment (38).” Therefore he concludes, “It is not necessary to (be able to) reduce
competing moral considerations to a common measure in order to make publicly
defensible choices (41).”
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Nicholas WolterstorfF17 also critiques the family of liberal positions on the basis that
there is no commonly accepted or shared political culture. He specifically challenges
Rawls as the leading representative o f the position that an independent source distinctive
from religious and other comprehensive doctrines must be established as a source for
moral-political decisions and debate. According to Walterstorff, the specific independent
source Rawls has is mind is public consensus. He writes, “Though he himself does not
use the term consensus populiy his suggestion, at bottom, is that, in a liberal democracy,
the consensus populi ought to be used to form the political basis and discussion and
decisions o f the citizens (91-92).” The common ground for citizens is “the shared
political culture of one’s liberal democracy (93).”
Walterstorff argues that it is unreasonable to expect all citizens to share a common
perception o f political culture because the political culture of the United States is in fact
constitutive o f many different views and conflicting strands. Walterstorff states, “The
prospect of extracting, from the political culture, principles of justice that are both shared
and appropriate to a liberal democracy, is hopeless (97).” He questions Rawls’s
conviction that people share a common form of reasoning leading to shared principles of
what constitutes a liberal democracy, irrespective of religious and comprehensive
doctrines. He states.
No matter what principles o f justice a particular political theorists may
propose, the reasonable thing for her to expect, given any plausible
understanding whatever o f ‘reasonable’ and rational, is not that all
reasonable and rational citizens would accept those principles, but rather
that not all o f them would do so. It would be utterly unreasonable for her
to expect of them to accept them (99).
17 Nicholas Walterstorff earned an M.A. & Ph.D. from Harvard University in philosophy. He was a
professor o f philosophy for twenty years at Calvin College. He currently serves as Noah Porter Professor
o f Philosophical Theology in the Yale Divinity School and is an adjunct professor in the Philosophy and
Religious Studies Department.
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According to Walterstorff, Rawls concedes that finding a shared principle of justice is
untenable. Finding shared principles, as an independent source for moral-political
decisions, is an ideal or goal (101-102).
Walterstorff also argues that no independent resource yields principles needed to
resolve tough, complex, convoluted moral-political issues. He mirrors the sentiment o f
Greenawalt who argues in his thesis that principles of a liberal democracy are
inconclusive and unable to resolve complex moral issues like abortion and animal rights.
The principles o f a liberal democracy are irrelevant on critical issues o f debate. They
cannot resolve critical moral issues like when and should a fetus deserve equal protection
under the law, when does it gain viability and the right to life (102)? And finally, he
believes it is unfair to ask people who sincerely believe religious convictions ought to be
a part o f their moral-political decisions, to agree that their convictions are something
other than politics. For many people of faith, their religious convictions shape and
inform their political convictions, the way we ought to order our lives together.
I mentioned earlier in the paper that Richards argues, “Our heritage of both
utilitarian and Kantian ethics maintains that our moral powers acknowledge
uncompromising ethical obligations independent of God’s will (138).” His statement
indicates he believes that the Enlightenment goal o f establishing a universally accepted
moral-ethical paradigm rationally justified apart from religious truth has been successful.
18

Adrian MacIntyre challenges this premise in his book, After Virtue. According to
MacIntyre, the common characteristic of contemporary philosophy is disagreement:
“there seems to be no rational way o f securing moral agreement in our culture (6).” My
18 Alisdair MacIntyre was a professor o f philosophy at Vanderbilt University when After Virtue was
published in 1981. He later served as Professor o f Philosophy at Notre Dame.
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point here is simply to highlight the fact that there is no unanimity among contemporary
moral philosophers on a commonly accepted rationality, that is, there is no commonly
accepted, rational, “objective” method to weigh rival moral-premises embraced by all.
Stephen Carter19makes the same argument in his book The Culture o f Unbelief He
argues that Post-Enlightenment moral philosophy has been unable to establish settled
rules to determine truth. He writes, “The principal contribution of the Enlightenment was
to introduce rationalism to philosophy, to press the case that human reason, by observing
and deducing, could resolve both moral and factual propositions without the need to
resort to divine authority (215).” Carter raises the question suggested by philosopher
Jeffery Stout: has rationalism been so successful “that not only is God unavailable as a
justification for knowledge, nothing else is either?” When it comes to the issue o f public
morality and laws that constrain, one is left with “an often bewildering variety of
approaches to the problem o f determining the validity o f moral claims (215).” Carter
argues that in a morally diverse and pluralistic society, it is a myth to argue our culture
shares “common starting points or common forms of reasoning (218).” He challenges
scientific methodology as the final arbitrator and only admissible epistemology to
determine issues of morality, a methodology that establishes knowledge and truth on the
basis o f empirical evidence both measurable and testable and thereby falsifiable. Carter
contends that scientific naturalism as an epistemology and religious belief as an
epistemology are both very much concerned with facts. Carter raises an important
question: why reject a religious starting point in public debate, while including others;
“moral claims, unlike factual claims, do nor rely for their validity on the generation o f

19 Stephen Carter is the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at Yale University and his specialty is
constitutional law.
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testable hypothesis. A question that has bedeviled Western Philosophy since the
Enlightenment is just what moral claims do rely on for validity (225).”
A challenge is also raised to the belief the state must remain neutral on concepts of the
good. Galston writes, “No form o f government can be justified without some view of
what is good for individuals (79).” According to Galston, the proponents of political
liberalism maintain that the state should be neutral on conceptions of the good because:
first, they hold there is no rational basis for choosing the best good among many; second,
to do so would violate individual freedom - to force a good - on individuals; and third,
diversity is a fact o f modernity. He faults these premises because they assume moral
skepticism and a lexical priority of individual interests over community interests. He
denies, “The non-coerced pursuit o f the bad enjoys priority in principle - that is -in every
case - over the coerced pursuit of the good (87).” As an example, coercive laws that
prohibit an individual’s right to discriminate in housing or labor practices are legitimate.
The coerced pursuit o f “fair” housing and labor laws is a good that deserves lexical
priority to an individual’s right to discriminate. He rejects the lexical priority of negative
freedom and argues that the liberal commitment to negative freedom is not unlimited and
unbounded (89). In fairness to the authors discussed thus far, no one has advocated
unlimited and unbounded freedom. At the very least, there is a common appeal to some
derivative of Mill’s harm principle. Personal freedom is constrained by the principle of
harm to others in society. It is the difficulty of finding a common consensus on the
definition of what constitutes harm that embitters public debate on so many key issues
even within the family of liberal positions.
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Galston denies that a commitment to liberalism implies a commitment to relativism on
concepts of the good- all good is equal. He holds instead, liberalism is a commitment to a
conception o f the good that places value on equality, liberty, negative freedom,
individuality, respect, and toleration. These principles of liberalism have “intrinsic
worth” which elevates them to first principles and “highest order interests (91).”
According to Galston, “the theory of good presupposed by Rawls, Ackerman, and Nagle,
is the theory o f rationalist humanism... liberal humanism is not only a substantive theory
of the good but an eminently contestable theory (92).” He even argues that the liberal
commitment to moral rationality is coercive and pervasive when it is taught in public
schools and questions if this concept of the good is hospitable to all ways o f life (95). He
believes liberal humanism is a distinct worldview imposed by a commitment to a rational,
scientific discourse that excludes religious epistemology. Galston believes that moralpolitical theorists like Rawls, Ackerman, and Richards defend secular scientific
humanism and rationalism as authoritative and normative for the way society “ought to
be” and thereby rightfully coerced by the state. Anything “religious” must be converted
into terms and rationales consistent with a scientific methodology of observable facts,
testable hypothesis and reasons accessible to all.
Galston contends that neutrality is not possible in idea or as a fact (97). Neutrality is
not neutral because it gives preference to civil considerations when religious practices
come into conflict. Galston quotes theologian Jon Gunneman to illustrate his point:
‘The liberal state, like any state, is not and cannot be fully legitimate. The
liberal state in particular is illegitimate insofar as it insists on seeing my
beliefs as my own individual preferences rather than as public truth-claims
about the world, truth-claims deeply embedded in a social tradition that
gives those o f us it our primary identity and limits all other claims of
authority. What will you do with us?5(117)
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Galston asserts that liberal theory relies on three important conceptions of the good: “the
worth o f human existence, the value of the fulfillment of human purposes, and the
commitment to rationality as the chief guide” in human endeavor (143-144). He argues
this is a restrictive theory o f the good.
He specifically challenges Ackerman’s belief that there should be constraints upon
reasons that justify public policy by appealing to a superior way of life or concept o f the
good. He challenges Ackerman on three points. First, public debate does not always
(even often) reach consensus, especially on particulars. Second, an appeal to rational
argument is itself not neutral; it favors one epistemological approach over others. And
third, any neutral dialogue must begin with some concept of the good. (106-109).
Kent Greenawalt

is another author addressing the complicated relationship between

the church and state in American society and the proper role of religious convictions in
moral-political discourse. He stands in opposition to political theorist Ackerman,
Richards, and Rawls who posit that religious convictions constitute an illegitimate basis
for moral-political justification in a liberal democracy until translated into reasons
accessible and acceptable to all. He believes that a basic tenant of political liberalism is
the right to hold and express personal opinions and beliefs, religious or nonreligious;
excluding religious convictions as a general rule in moral political debate violates the
basic foundations o f liberalism, equality, freedom of thought, and freedom o f expression.
He further argues that religious convictions are “proper” in moral-political justification

20 Kent Greenawalt studied political philosophy at Oxford and law at Colombia. He has spent his career as
a legal academic and served as editor-in-chief o f the Columbia Law Review before joining the Colombia
faculty in 1965. He served as Law clerk to Supreme Court Justice John Harlan. His area o f interest
includes constitutional law and jurisprudence, with special emphasis on church and state.
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when shared premises and reasons accessible to all have proved to be inconclusive and
inadequate to resolve issues o f fact and value (231).
Greenawalt challenges two tenants o f liberalism: individualism and rationalism. He
writes:
Approval o f liberal democracy does imply acceptance of a degree of
individualism; a liberal democracy rejects compulsion of beliefs and
patterns of life and regards individuals as a vital protection o f a fair
political process. But a liberal democrat need not deny that human beings
are social creatures, that human character is socially formed, that the
arrival of partial truth is achieved by a process of community dialogue,
and that some o f the most fulfilling aspects of human existence involve
organic social units that have a kind of priority over the individuals within
them. [He also argues that] unstinting rationalism is no more a required
component o f a justification for liberal democracy than unstinting
individualism... Acceptance of liberal democracy may presuppose an
ability of people to work out most practical conflicts by some sort of
reasoned process, but liberal democrats’ belief in rational capacities can
fall far short o f any assumption that all or most fundamental human
problems have correct answers at which people arrive by rational
deliberation (22-23).
This challenge by Greenawalt to these assumed characteristics o f political liberalism
becomes crucial to his later argument for the inclusion of religious convictions in moralpolitical debate: “The argument against reliance on religious convictions often comes
down to an argument fo r reliance on premises that are deemed rational in some way that
excludes religious convictions (23).” He posits, “though a liberal democracy involves a
limited commitment to public accessible reasons for decisions, it does not entail for the
political realm either exclusive reliance on such reasons or an unqualified acceptance of a
narrow form of rationalism (25).” He believes that in American society, religious
convictions inform or influence many citizens’ ethical choices, including moral-political
judgments (30). He argues against any principle in a liberal democracy that excludes
moral premises solely on the basis that they are religious convictions. Those who
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advocate this principle fail to recognize how difficult it is for the average citizen to
separate those views shaped by religious convictions and those based on rational criteria
(44). Greenawalt writes, “theories that exclude many nonreligious premises as well as
religious convictions do not leave ample grounds for citizens to resolve many political
issues.” And again he writes, “that no adequate reason exists for preferring all
nonreligious premises to religious convictions as bases for political judgments (49).”
Michael Perry in his book Love and Power makes some o f the same arguments as
Greenawalt when he argues for a less constrained role for religious convictions in moralpolitical discourse. Perry seeks to establish a place at the public table for religious
discourse, and specifically, rules for religious justification for political choices. He
declares in his introduction, “This book is about the proper relation of morality to politics
in a morally pluralistic society like the United States. More precisely, it is about the
proper relation o f a person’s moral beliefs to her political choices, and especially, to her
public deliberation about her public justification o f political choices (3).” His intent is to
answer the following question: “If religious-moral discourse should not be excluded
from the public square, how should it be included? In particular, how should discourse
be brought to bear in the practice of political justification (5)?” He seeks to find a
middle ground between those with a moral-political philosophy that would divest
religious-moral discourse of its political authority and “those who would bring religiousmoral discourse to bear in a sectarian, divisive way (5).”
Perry challenges the viewpoints of three prominent political philosophers-theorists:
Bruce Ackerman, Thomas Nagel, and John Rawls. He critiques their understanding of
the proper relationship between religious discourse, morality, and law. He posits that
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even though they may offer a variety of viewpoints and perspectives, they hold in
common the controlling theme that “disputed beliefs... about human good should play no
or at most a marginal role in political justification (9).” The disputed beliefs the above
mentioned authors have in mind usually involve beliefs about human good informed by
religious convictions, and specifically, religious convictions that are based on an
epistemology that embraces a belief in the priority of transcendent truth or specific
revelation such as that contained in a sacred text.
Perry critiques Ackerman’s contention that the sole legitimate basis for coercive law is
overlapping moral consensus, that is, moral premises shared by all are the only proper
justifications for law that constrain individual liberty. Perry argues that finding shared
normative premises may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, because America is a
morally pluralistic society with many different ideas of what constitutes the good and
fitting way to live human life. Second, even if common ground is found, this does not
necessarily mean that moral-ethical issues will be resolved as a point o f law. Third, by
including only those moral premises that individuals hold in common and excluding
others that are disputed, certain moral premises become privileged. Perry echoes the
sentiment of Greenawalt in this last premise (9).
Perry contends that an individual may be forced to delegitimize very important core
convictions and beliefs because they are not shared by another individual, for instance,
beliefs informed by an epistemology based on “special revelation.” In contrast, another
individual may find they are able to retain most, if not all, of their core beliefs because
they are common ground beliefs. Common ground beliefs become “privileged” beliefs
that can serve as a justification for moral-political decisions, while “disputed” beliefs are
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divested of any authority in public discourse. Perry argues that disputed moral premises
should not be banned from public debate just because they are disputed beliefs. If public
debate and compromise revolve only around “common ground” moral premises, there is
less room for compromise. If disputed beliefs are excluded from the debate as a rule,
then the bracketing and exclusion o f core moral premises becomes the price o f admission
to moral-political discourse for some individuals. This creates a situation that may sow
seeds of resentment and discontent in a liberal democracy, a political process that should
be open to the discussion o f diverse ideas and positions.
Perry also critiques Thomas Nagel and his moral-political paradigm that asks each
individual to locate a moral starting point that is independent of “who we are”. In other
words, one is asked to distance themselves from their presuppositions, their core values,
their history and experiences. The common denominator in moral-political justification
in Nagel’s approach becomes “common critical rationality” and “evidence that can be
shared” (12). Perry critiques Nagel by raising two questions: what evidence does Nagel
believe can be shared, and what does Nagel mean by common critical rationality? Perry
argues that the ground one person accepts or rejects as rational or reasonable is tied to
one’s own understanding o f truth and reality within their own belief system. He
challenges Nagel on the basis of epistemology. In a pluralistic society, Perry argues that
not everyone is going to find a common ground in defining critical rationality and
evidence that can be shared by all.
Perry also critiques John Rawls although he favors the neutral or common ground
paradigm advocated by Rawls. Perry believes it is superior to Ackerman and Nagel
because, in his opinion, Rawls does not make the mistake of “privileging” common
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premises while rejecting unshared premises (23). According to Perry, Rawls seeks a
common ground among several different religious and philosophical doctrines in which
none are rejected or accepted outright. He seeks a point o f contravention, a common
ground of shared moral premises, a common consensus that becomes authoritative in
terms of defining the common good because they work to meet human needs.
Perry’s critique of Rawls’ common ground approach to moral-political justification
centers on this issue: although Perry acknowledges that broad general principles do
emerge in a form of consensus, that people generally agree one should not murder, steal,
rape, bear false witness against their neighbor, it is in the particulars where Rawls’s
approach becomes problematic. In a pluralistic society like the United States, competing
views of truth and human good create a moral-political atmosphere in which it is
extremely difficult to find consensus on particulars. It is the details of common life and
law that deflate the common ground hypothesis.
Perry’s critique of the common ground or neutral ground paradigm for moral-political
justification centers on two crucial concepts. First, a paradigm that proposes to be neutral
and impartial in fact is neither; it favors common ground beliefs over disputed beliefs.
Second, the exclusion of disputed moral premises is unnecessarily restrictive. In the
words of Perry:
A practice of political justification from which disputed beliefs about
human good are excluded lacks the normative resources required for
addressing our most fundamental political-moral questions .... Only a
politics in which beliefs about human good, including disputed beliefs,
have a central place is capable of addressing such issues (42).
Perry argues therefore, an individual’s most compelling beliefs, those core values that
define the ultimate meanings of life and give import to how one defines the good and
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fitting life, may in fact reside in the sphere o f disputed beliefs. To exclude these disputed
beliefs as a general principle is an unconscionable burden on any citizen, certainly a
citizen in a liberal democracy, a political system that defends an individual’s right to
pursue life, liberty, and happiness, and defends such rights as freedom o f speech, freedom
of assembly, and freedom o f religion. As did Galston, Perry argues that there is a
presumed ontology in secularism that leads to a conclusion about “the good and fitting
life”. To accept one conception o f the good while rejecting another in fact violates the
liberal principle o f state neutrality on conceptions of the good.
Like Perry, Greenawalt also challenges “the thesis that political decisions should be
made on naturalistic, nonreligious publicly accessible grounds.” He specifically
castigates Ackerman for his “less than enthusiastic sympathy with religious
perspectives.” He argues that a liberal democracy should not tell citizens how or on
what basis moral premises should be informed. In other words, how I get to my moral
premises is my business and a product o f individual freedom not to be restricted by well
meaning moral-political philosophers (55).
Greenawalt argues that many moral-political issues are complex and defy resolution
by shared common premises and publicly accessible reasons, especially in light o f the
growing diversity o f American society. In those instances Greenawalt posits:
A good argument exists that a person’s reliance on religious grounds
should be regarded as appropriate if everyone must inevitably use
“nonpublic” reasons of some sort or other. I do not rely on any claim that
depriving public decisions of religiously based understanding will result in
bad laws and policies, impoverished political dialogue, or undermine the
stability o f law and government. Rather my argument is based on simple
notions o f fairness and tolerance o f diverse beliefs ... .If all people must
draw from their personal experiences and commitments of values to some
degree, people whose experience leads them to religious convictions
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should not have to disregard what they consider the critical insights about
value that their convictions provide (144-145).
Greenawalt raises three possible critiques of his premise raised by opponents to his
position. The first critique simply contends that rational arguments always have
something to say in moral-political debate; rational arguments are not inconclusive in
moral-political debate. Greenawalt responds to this critique in a straightforward manner.
Although publicly accessible reasons may have something to say about all moral
premises, it does not necessarily follow that those contributions are conclusive. As an
example, how does one answer the question: do worms have a higher moral status than
dolphins in animal rights issues? It is Greenawalt’s sense that scientific naturalism can
be inconclusive (146-147). A second critique makes the point: a comprehensive ethical
paradigm such as utilitarianism can be used to resolve the issues when public accessible
reasons are inconclusive and prove to be inadequate to resolve specific moral-political
issues. Greenawalt responds, in a culture as diverse and pluralistic as American society,
people don’t agree on any one ethical paradigm. A third critique argues that religious
based grounds are distinguishable from other personal based grounds and religious
convictions are improper while other personal based grounds are not improper.
According to Greenawalt, this critique fails to appreciate the difficulty of separating
individual beliefs informed by religious convictions and beliefs informed by other
personal beliefs. He writes:
To demand that many devout Catholics, Protestants, and Jews pluck out
their religious convictions is to ask them how they would think about a
critical moral problem if they started from scratch, disregarding what they
presently take as basic premises of moral thought. Asking that people
perform this exercise is not only unrealistic in the sense impossible; the
implicit demand that people compartmentalize beliefs that constitute some
kind o f unity in their approach to life is positively objectionable (155).
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I believe this explicit demand is objectionable to Greenawalt because in a very real sense
this imposition on one’s ethical paradigm is intolerant o f individual autonomy. This
imposition violates a sacred tenant o f political liberalism.
There is an apparent contradiction in the arguments o f Perry and Greenawalt. They
both validate the necessity o f translating religious based moral beliefs into a commonly
understood terminology. Greenawalt writes, “The common currency of political
discourse is nonreligious argument about human welfare. Public discourse about political
issues with those who do not share religious premises should be cast in other than
religious terms (217).” Perry likewise argues, for a religious argument to be legitimate in
moral-political justification, it must find a common ground of authoritative truth
amenable to all audiences and identify a public purpose or public good. Perry advocates
a common ground between people with different beliefs, values, and concepts o f the
common good. The moral-political discourse should focus on those behaviors that
private and community experience indicate make a human grow and mature and flourish
(111). I am not sure how they differentiate the necessity o f a nonreligious argument from
Ackerman’s “neutral dialogue”, or Nagel’s and Richards’ overlapping moral consensus,
or Audis’ reasons accepted by all. They seem to be saying the very same thing.
Regardless o f a person’s starting point for moral premises, religious or otherwise, public
debate concerning the justification for coercive law must be grounded on reasons
accepted and accessible to all. Rawls, Ackerman, Nagle, and Richards have consistently
argued this very point.
Perry also responds to the argument raised earlier in this paper by Hammond and
Richards. They argued that a moral-political paradigm that includes religious convictions
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as a justification for legislation violates the establishment clause o f the First Amendment.
Perry contends that there is a difference between forcing people to adapt a religious faith
system and justifying moral premises as a justification for law upon religious arguments.
Religious arguments and justification for law that meet the criteria for admission to the
public debate would not make them unconstitutional anymore than any moral premise
would be unconstitutional because o f its source. Perry argues that in regard to the
establishment clause, courts have interpreted the establishment clause to mean simply
that laws must have a secular purpose. His point, “Coercive legislation is virtually
always based (in part, at least) on a belief that the prohibited way o f acting or living
involves either physical or psychological harm (or both), whether to persons who live or
act the prohibited way, to other persons or entities, or to both (115).” As has already
been stated, the embittered nature o f moral-political debate often centers upon divergent
interpretations o f what constitutes “physical harm” or “psychological harm.”
The bottom line according to Perry, laws based on any rationale, religious or
otherwise, that fail to meet the standard of “physical harm” or “psychological harm”, are
equally invalid. In other words, religious-moral premises that meet the criteria o f
providing publicly intelligible and accessible reasons would in fact establish secular
reasons for legislation that courts have recognized as valid and Constitutional; therefore,
an interpretation o f the First Amendment establishment clause does not proscribe
religious based moral premises as a justification for legislation as long the religious
premise is not the sole justification; it would even allow the religious premise to be the
primary justification.

44

In a similar vein, Greenawalt argues that religious convictions as a justification for
moral premises should be included along with other personal methods and ethical
paradigms in the public debate. To exclude religious convictions as a general principle is
both intolerant and illiberal in a moral and ethically diverse society. The specific
conditions that constitute a proper role for religious convictions in moral-political
discourse arise when common premises and accessible forms of reasoning prove to be
inconclusive in the resolution o f value judgments as the affect laws and public policy. He
concludes, “Even though a model o f our liberal democracy includes a limited
commitment to shared bases of evaluation, it leaves considerable room for religious
citizens to rely on religious grounds for moral judgments that affect law and public policy
(216).”

Perry, Greenawalt, and Walterstorff clearly are at odds with the “strong view”
as defined by Audi, but share much in common with the views o f Audi,
Hammond, Richards, and even Rawls as defined by the “weaker view”. They
agree that a person’s religious, and non-religious convictions, can properly inform
political choices, but maintain that there is a responsibility in a liberal democracy
to appeal to some common ground moral premise, or at the very least, to some
derivative o f Mill’s harm principle. Some constraints upon religious convictions
as a justification for coercive law is a commonly accepted premise. The debate
centers upon the extent and nature o f such constraints.

C ourt Cases on Obscenity Law Jurisprudence
Up to this point, I have discussed the proper role of religious convictions as a
theoretical question, the domain of the moral-political philosopher. I will now consider
the same question inside a concrete moment o f American history. I turn to four important
court cases involving obscenity laws. These will serve as the primary resource for
exploring the proper role o f religious convictions in moral-political discourse, with
application to the wider question of ethics, how ought we to order our lives together.
They are as follows: Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Memoirs v.
Massachusetts 383 U.S. 413 (1966), Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and Paris
Adult Theatre 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
These court cases turn on three crucial questions: (1) can the state and federal
government legislate coercive restraints upon access and distribution of material deemed
obscene (and to what degree)? (2) Does any such constraint violate the First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and freedom o f press? (3) What objective
standard or criteria can be applied to evaluate what constitutes obscene material? To
these three questions, an additional question has been raised as part of a feminist
argument: do some forms o f obscenity subordinate women and therefore provide a
foundation for legal restrictions based on issues of equality?21

21 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory o f State.

45

46

Questions that guided my research included: how did the judges explicitly justify their
decisions? What are the possible implicit justifications? What principles of liberal
democracy guided their decisions? Were religious convictions explicitly excluded? Were
the decisions reflective of conflict and compromise or o f unanimity?
I begin with Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476 (1957). This case also involved
Albert v. United States. The Supreme Court argued and decided these two cases
together. The central issue in both cases focused on “the constitutionality o f a criminal
obscenity statue (Roth 479).” Private citizens in both cases challenged the obscenity
statue on the basis of the First Amendment rights o f free speech and freedom of the press.
For the purpose of my research, I am concerned only with the judge’s explicit and
implicit justifications for their decisions. I do not intend to provide any detailed
discussion on the resolution of the cases.
The Roth decision is a benchmark in obscenity case jurisprudence because it
articulates a definition of obscenity and establishes three criteria to guide court decisions.
’Justice Brennon provides this definition o f obscenity: material is lewd and obscene if “to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest (Roth 489).” Under this definition,
as elaborated in subsequent cases since Roth, three elements must coalesce to determine
if materials are deemed obscene. These are as follows:
(1) The dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests.
(2) The material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary standards
relating to the description or representation of sexual matters.
(3) The material is utterly without redeeming social value (Memoirs 418).
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The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Brennon, defends the states right to enact
obscenity laws, deciding that the First Amendment protection of free speech does not
extend to material deemed to be obscene. The arguments justifying coercive obscenity
laws in the majority opinion follow four main contours: (1) historical precedent, (2) harm
to social fabric, (3) harm to other individuals, and (4) appeal to community moral
consensus. I will consider each argument in order along with the dissenting view.
Justice Brennon, writing the majority opinion, argues from a historical precedent as
reflected in “the universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the
international agreement o f over fifty nations, in the obscenity laws o f all o f the fortyeight states, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by Congress from 1842 to 1956 (Roth
485).” Justice Warren concurs when he writes: “there is a social problem” reflected in
the laws enacted in forty-eight states as well as Congress (Roth 495). He adds a word of
caution when he acknowledges that there have been historical mistakes that improperly
encroached on free speech. Because o f past mistakes, he believes the court should decide
with humility and legal restraint; just because there is a problem does not justify any or
all measures to rectify.
Justice Harlan in dissent states, “In the final analysis, the problem presented by these
cases is how far, and on what terms, the state and federal government have power to
punish individuals for disseminating books considered to be undesirable because of their
nature or supposed deleterious effect upon human conduct (Roth 496-497).” He argues
that any constraint upon particular material is an individual matter not to be decided by
the courts. Justice Harlan’s initial response to the majority opinion simply articulates a
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deeply held liberal principle and tradition traced through Locke and Mill: the right for
each individual to choose in matters of conscience.
Justice Brennon, speaking for the majority, appeals to a historical precedent both
internationally and in the United States, in short, past national and international
consensus implies a current justification for obscenity laws. In context, no rationale is
provided for past precedence in obscenity law. Certainly in his appeal to historical
precedent, Justice Brennon makes no explicit appeal or reference to religious convictions
as a basis for past obscenity laws, but it is fair to raise the question: were past obscenity
laws justified in part based upon religious convictions? I only suggest it would be
difficult to separate moral premises based upon religious convictions from moral
premises based on reasons accessible to all, certainly in the context of judicial history.
Robert Audi raises this as an issue in his article “77ze Place o f Religious Argument in a
Free and Democratic Society”. In his definition o f a religious argument, he includes
those moral premises that can be traced back to a historical link that is religious in nature
(Audi Religious Arguments 683). In this light, the appeal Justice Brennon and Justice
Warren make to historical precedence could result in a connection between coercive law
and religious conviction, although this is certainly not their intent.
A second argument advanced by Justice Brennon concerns the moral fabric o f society
and supports a communitarian argument. He quotes the judgment expressed in
Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 5-1— 572, “It has been observed that such
utterances [lewd and obscene]... are of such slight social value... any benefit that my be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality
(Roth 485).” Emphasis mine. Chief Justice Warren echoes this same sentiment when he
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agrees with the California courts that obscenity has a substantial tendency to corrupt
(Roth 494).
It is interesting to note that although Justice Harlan dissented in the Roth decision, he
concurred in the Albert decision. In the second case, Harlan agreed that the state could
enforce obscenity laws that involved unsolicited distribution of material deemed obscene.
He writes, “the state had a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of the home
against an invasion of unsolicited obscenity (Roth 502). What I find to be o f particular
interest is a statement that seems inconsistent with his earlier comment defending
individual liberty of conscience from state intrusion. He writes:
It seems to me clear that it is not irrational, in our present state o f
knowledge, to consider that pornography can induce a type of sexual
conduct which a state may deem obnoxious to the moral fabric of
society... .The state can reasonable draw the inference that over a long
period o f time the indiscriminate dissemination of materials, the essential
character o f which is to degrade sex, will have an eroding effect on moral
standards (Roth 501).
In fairness to Justice Harlan, I want to place this quotation within context. He is not
defending the right of the state to decide what is lewd and obscene to individuals. He
believes this to be a matter o f personal conscience. Instead, he defends the state’s right to
constrain unsolicited distribution o f questionable material. Though he recognizes there
may be a public harm such as an erosion o f moral standards, he does not consider this
sufficient justification for coercive constraints upon individual liberty and conscience.
John Locke and John Stuart Mill would disagree on this same point. Locke argues
that “no opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules necessary to the
preservation o f civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate... such things as
undermine the foundations of society, and are therefore condemned by the judgment of
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all mankind (Locke Toleration 61).” Mill argues, in contrast to Locke, that liberty
comprises:
First, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty o f
conscience, in the most comprehensive sense, absolute freedom of opinion
and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral or
theological... .Secondly, the principle [of liberty] requires liberty o f tastes
and pursuits; o f framing the plan of life to suit our own character; o f doing
as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without
impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not
harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse,
or wrong (15).
The crucial question raised by the justices in the Roth case and implicit in both Locke and
Mill is this: what constitutes harm for others? Certainly Justice Brennon’s argument is
consistent with a Lockean understanding of moral-political discourse: moral rules
necessary to the preservation of civil society are legitimate concerns o f the community
and can be enforced by law.
This brings us to a third argument. Justice Brennon explicitly appeals to the harm
principle as a justification for obscenity laws; however, he does not believe there must be
conclusive evidence of a causal connection between obscenity and harm to others. He
writes, “Convictions may be had without proof either that obscene material will
perceptibly create a clear and present danger of anti-social behavior (Roth 486).” In
other words, convictions alone are sufficient grounds for coercive laws without
conclusive demonstrative proof of any perceived harm. I raise the question: what is the
basis for such convictions? Can such convictions be based upon religious convictions?
And again, how would one separate religious conviction from secular convictions? This
is the issue Kent Greenawalt raises in his book Religious Convictions in Political Choice.

He argues that it is difficult for the average citizen to separate which of their views are
shaped by religious convictions and which are based on rational criteria (44).
Justice Harlan does not challenge the harm principle, that is, harm to others can be
constrained by law. He does however disagree with laws grounded in only the perception
o f social harm: “The assumption seems to be that the distribution of certain types of
literature will induce criminal or immoral behavior (Roth 501).” This is an assumption
that, according to Justice Harlan, sociologist, psychiatrists and penologists are in sharp
disagreement about. Justice Douglas and Justice Black are even more explicit in their
dissent on this issue. They believe it is wrong to punish thoughts provoked rather than
for overt acts and anti-social behavior. Justice Douglas writes, “to allow the state to step
in and punish mere speech or publication that the judge thinks has an undesirable impact
on thoughts but that is not shown to be a part of unlawful action is drastically to curtail
the First Amendment (Roth 509).” He further writes, “if we were certain that impurity of
sexual thoughts impelled to action, we would be on less dangerous ground in punishing
the distributors of this sex literature (Roth 510).”
Neither the majority nor dissenting judges disagree on the harm principle. There is
general agreement that if the expression of individual thought or action harms another
person, and there is conclusive evidence that a causal relationship exists, then law is a
legitimate response. The judges disagree on the nature o f evidence necessary to justify
law. Justice Brennon defends convictions without proof; Justice Douglas defends
convictions based upon reasons accessible to all. Both viewpoints implicitly allow
religious convictions to serve as a partial justification for law. From justice Brennon’s
viewpoint, the justification for the conviction that obscenity causes a public harm could
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be “veiled” religious convictions at the very least. From Justice Douglas’s position,
religious conviction could be the most compelling reason in a citizens or judges mind, but
other evidence for a public harm would be required. In his view, religious convictions
could not stand alone as a justification for law.
Justice Brennon, speaking for the majority, raises another controversial argument to
defend the court’s decision. In his definition o f obscenity, he alludes to “contemporary
community standards.” Quoting the trial lawyer, he writes, “You must ask yourselves
does it offend the common conscience o f the community by present-day standards”. He
further quotes the specific words spoken to the jury by the trial judge: “In this case, ladies
and gentlemen o f the jury, you and you alone are the exclusive judges of what the
common conscience o f the community is, and in determining that conscience, you are to
consider the community as a whole, young and old, educated and uneducated, the
religious and irreligious - men, women, and children (Roth 490).”
In the state case, the jury served as a proxy moral conscience for the entire
community, a position that Justice Douglas finds troubling in his dissent. He writes, “any
test that turns on what is offensive to the community is too loose, too capricious.” He
further writes, “I can understand (and at times even sympathize) with programs o f civic
groups and church groups to protect and defend existing moral standards of the
community... when speech alone is involved... I do not think the government, consistent
with the First Amendment, can throw its weight behind one school or another (Roth
512).”
I hear components of both the thought of Mill and Rawls in the reticence o f Justice
Douglas. In the words of Justice Douglas, I hear the echo of Mill: “there needs protection
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also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of
society to impose by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules
o f conduct on those who dissent from them (Mill 8).” I hear also a prophetic anticipation
of Rawls’s Theory o f Justice when he writes about the priority o f the individual right o f
free speech over the priority o f the good o f the social moral-fabric. He also defends state
neutrality between concepts o f the good. I realize of course that Justice Douglas is
writing in 1957 and Rawls’s Theory o f Justice is published over fifteen years later. It is
clear that conceptions o f liberal principles as a priority in justifying law and state
neutrality on conceptions o f the good life, are embedded in the dissenting opinion o f
Justice Douglas long before Rawls publishes his seminal work.
The concept o f laws based on community moral consensus, certainly raises some
critical questions. What are the grounds for community moral consensus? Is community
moral consensus tied to religious convictions? I am not far off base when I posit, time
and location would greatly influence the answer. There would be a great diversity o f
opinion among a jury consisting o f citizens from Alma, Arkansas (home of my parents);
or Salt Lake City, Utah; or Boston, Massachusetts. Justice Harlan recognizes this
community and state diversity when he writes: “Congress has no power over sexual
morality... [it is] the states, which bear direct responsibility for the protection o f the local
moral fabric (Roth 504).”
The judges articulate clearly in the court records of Roth v. United States a sharp
disagreement over the rights and interests of the individual and the community. The
court records reflect no explicit appeal to religious convictions as a proper justification
for obscenity laws; however, the concepts of judicial precedent, community moral
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consensus, and perceived public harm permit an implicit justification for religious
convictions to play an active role in shaping and defining individual values and public
discourse.
I next consider Memoirs v. Massachusetts 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The Supreme Court
o f Massachusetts concluded that the book Memoirs o f a Woman ofPleasure (Fanny Hill)
was obscene and thereby not protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the state decision. The majority opinion
concluded that the State Supreme Court failed to properly interpret the third criteria for
defining obscenity as articulated in Roth v. United States. The third criterion qualifies
material deemed lewd and obscene as “utterly without redeeming social value (Memoirs
418).”
This case takes on added significance because o f a view expressed by Justice Clark.
He argued in the dissent that the phrase “utterly without redeeming social value” opened
a Pandora’s box for obscenity legislation because any material could be thinly veiled as
art, history, or literature. He argued for a standard that was subsequently established in
Miller v. United States.
In Miller the third criteria defining obscene material was changed from “utterly
without redeeming social value” to “whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or social value (Miller 39).” The book in question described
the life o f a woman trapped in a life o f prostitution until, at the end o f the book, she
escapes prostitution and marries her true love. The great body o f the text is a drama of
descriptive sexual expression considered by many to be deviant and obscene. According
to Justice Brennon, the sole issue before the court was, “whether Memoirs satisfies the
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test o f obscenity established in Roth v. United States (Memoirs 418).” He believed that
sufficient expert witness had argued that the book in question did have literary merit and
historical value. The book could not be deemed obscene and censored under
Massachusetts law because it was not utterly without redeeming social value (Memoirs
422-423).
Justice Douglas, concurred with the majority opinion, but he did so on the basis of
arguments he advanced in Roth v. United States. He writes, “I base my vote to reverse
on my view that the first Amendment does not permit the censorship o f expression not
brigaded with illegal action (Memoirs 426).” Douglas believes censorship to be the most
notorious violation o f free speech because “it substitutes majority rule where minority
tastes or viewpoints were to be tolerated (Memoirs 427).” Douglas defends his position
on a liberal principle that greatly values the protection o f individual thought and
expression in matters of conscience. He vehemently challenges the communitarian
argument that obscenity should be censored to protect community interests. He writes,
“publications and utterances were made immune from majoritarian control by the First
Amendment, applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth. No exceptions were
made, not even for obscenity (Memoirs 428).” He further adds, “The censor is always
quick to justify his action in terms that are protective o f society” and believes the
argument that obscenity results in anti-social behavior is inconclusive (Memoirs 431).
Justice Clark offers an interesting point in dissent, “to say that social value may
‘redeem’ implies that courts must balance alleged esthetic merit against harmful
consequences that may flow from pornography (Memoirs 451).” He argues, though there
is a diversity o f opinion among experts, there are strong voices suggesting a correlation
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between criminal, anti-social behavior and pornography. Such danger o f harm
constitutes a rationale for laws to constrain the proliferation o f obscene material
(Memoirs 452). He writes, “Congress and legislatures o f every state have enacted
measures to restrict the distribution of erotic and pornographic material, justifying these
controls by reference to evidence that anti-social behavior may result in part from reading
obscenity (Memoirs 453).” He cites several court cases in which free speech was limited
based upon public welfare: Schneider v. State, 308 United States U.S. 147; Scheneck v.
United States 249 U.S. 47,52; United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201,201; just to name a
few. Justice Clark believes states should retain flexibility in determining matters o f
obscenity as it relates to matters o f public welfare (Memoirs 458).
Once again in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, there is no explicit reference to religious
convictions as a basis for obscenity laws. The conflict continues to emerge between the
interests o f individual rights and community welfare. Justice Douglas is a strong
proponent o f an absolute right to free speech. In contrast, Justice Clarke is concerned
with community welfare. The dispute centers on each judge’s concept of the harm
principle. Does pornographic material constitute a harm to other individuals and society,
or is it just a personal matter o f choice with no inherent dangers? A strong proponent of
absolute right to free speech would decry any effort to limit freedom o f expression that
appeals to a public harm, especially if such harm is tied to a majoritarian religious
conviction. A strong proponent o f the community right to protect the moral fabric o f
society could appeal to the perceived harm of pornography, a perception that may in fact
be informed by religious moral premises.
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Next I consider Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 (1973). As mentioned earlier, this
case establishes a new standard for evaluating obscenity cases because it rejects “utterly
without redeeming social value” as a constitutional standard for defining obscenity. The
United States Supreme Court upheld a California decision that the appellant could be
convicted for mailing unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of California
obscenity laws. The California statue was based upon the obscenity test articulated in
Memoirs v. Massachusetts in the plurality opinion. Unique to this case, sexually explicit
materials were aggressively thrust upon unwilling recipients through the mail (Miller 18).
The Miller decision established three key principles that serve as criteria in obscenity
case jurisprudence: (1) the application o f contemporary community standards; (2)
material must be patently offensive in depicting sexual act; and (3) must, as a whole, lack
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value (Miller 39).
Chief Justice Burger, writing the majority opinion, acknowledges, “No majority o f the
court has at any given time been able to determine what constitutes obscene,
pornographic material subject to regulation under the States police power (Miller 22).”
He does believe however that the following two principles have been categorically settled
by the courts: (1) obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment, and (2) the
First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been treated as absolutes (Miller 23).”
Chief Justice Burger offers a contrasting opinion to the view articulated by Douglas in
Memoirs. He does not interpret the free exercise clause as an absolute freedom as stated
by Douglas: “publications and utterances were made immune from majoritarian control
by the First Amendment, applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth. No
exceptions were made, not even for obscenity (Memoirs 428).”
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Chief Justice Burger, writing the majority opinion, attempts to establish a more
concrete and detailed definition of obscene material by citing specific examples of
inappropriate material. The majority opinion defines obscene material as “patently
offensive representations or descriptions o f ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted,
actual or simulated (Miller 25).” They take one additional step, attempting to articulate
“concrete guidelines to isolate ‘hardcore’ pornography from expression protected by the
First Amendment (Miller 29).”
The court also affirmed the judicial precedent established in Roth and Memoirs
agreeing that the application o f “contemporary standards of the state o f California... is
constitutionally adequate” to provide a community definition of obscene material (Miller
34). Justice Burger responds to the dissenting contention that there should be a national
standard defining obscenity. Instead, he argues that each society has the right to decide
on a community definition o f obscenity instead o f a nationally imposed standard (Miller
33-34). It is important to notice, the court affirms the concept o f a community standard
of obscenity in contrast to a purely individual standard. This seems to violate a cherished
principle o f the family of liberal positions as articulated by Mill and Rawls, the right for
the individual to decide in matters o f morals and conscience and the rejection o f a
coercive majoritarian community standard.
Notably absent in Miller is a discussion of the harm principle. Neither the majority
nor the dissenting opinion attempt to justify or challenge coercive laws on the basis o f the
Mill’s harm principle. The central issue argued is simply the constitutional right of the
community to establish some minimal moral standards enforced by law, a Lockean and
communitarian argument.
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The summary of the majority opinion follows: “we (a) reaffirm the Roth holding that
obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment; (b) hold that such material can
be regulated by the states... without showing that the material is ‘utterly without
redeeming social value’; and (c) hold that obscenity is to be determined by ‘applying
contemporary community standards...not national standards’ (Miller 37).”
Justice Douglas, writing in dissent, is offended by what he considers the new and
changing standards used to define obscenity:
Today we would add a new three-pronged test: (a) whether the average
person, applying contemporary community standards would find the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests,...(b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by applicable state law, and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. These are standards we ourselves have written into the constitution
(Miller 39).
He further states, “The idea that the First Amendment permits the government to ban
publications that are ‘offensive’ to some people puts an ominous gloss on freedom o f the
press ... to give the power to censor, as we do today, is to make a sharp and radical break
with the traditions o f a free society (Miller 44).”
Once again the court makes no explicit appeal to religious moral-premises as a
justification for coercive laws. I believe this to be a consistent confirmation that, in
American legal culture, at least since World War Two, an explicit appeal to religious
conviction is improper as a sole justification for law. However, I still raise the question:
how does society shape and develop a contemporary community standard? For some
individuals, their conception of moral standards on matters of conscience will be
informed by religious belief and convictions, convictions difficult to separate into
religious and secular.
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I consider another important case concerned with obscenity laws, Paris Adult Theatre
v. Slanton 413 U.S. 49 (1973). The Petitioners sued the respondents under Georgia civil
law, challenging the showing o f two adult movies considered by the petitioners to be
obscene. The United States Supreme Court upheld the Georgia state law, which set
constraints upon the public viewing of “hard core” pornography.
Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion. His argument follows five contours that I
will briefly trace. The majority opinion once again affirms that pornography is not
protected under the First Amendment because the constitution does not grant unlimited
freedom to “consenting adults”. The second argument appeals to a concern for
community welfare. Justice Burger writes, “we hold that there are legitimate state
interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercial obscenity, even assuming it is
feasible to enforce effective safeguards against exposure to juveniles and passerby (Paris
57-58).” He further argues that the interest o f the public “in the quality of life and total
community, the tone o f commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public
safety itself’ justifies constraints upon the public viewing of pornography (Paris 58). He
quotes expert witness, Professor Bickel, who testified “what is commonly read and seen
and heard and done intrudes upon us all, want it, or not (Paris 59).”
A third argument contends legislators are not required to justify coercive laws on
undisputed scientific data. Justice Burger writes, “Although there is no conclusive proof
o f a connection between anti-social behavior and obscene material, the legislature of
Georgia could quite reasonably determine that such a connection does or might exist
(Paris 61).” He argues that, in fact, such assumptions underlie much lawful state
regulation.
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He next challenges a strong, “absolutist” conception o f a constitutional right to
untrammeled freedom of action. He writes, “Most exercises o f individual free choice those in public politics, religion, and expression of ideas - are explicitly protected by the
Constitution. Totally unlimited play for free will, however, is not allowed in our or any
other society (Paris 64)”. With this statement, he acknowledges the inherent tension
between liberty and law, indivual rights and community interests.
Justice Burger next responds to the contention that the right to privacy entails
protected access to obscene material by consenting adults. He simply writes that the
private home is not the same as the public square and that “the issue in this context goes
beyond whether someone, or even the majority, considers the conduct depicted as
‘wrong’ or ‘sinful’. The States have the power to make a morally neutral judgment that
public exhibition o f obscene material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole,
to endanger the public safety (Paris 64).”
This last argument deserves closer scrutiny because it raises some issues not discussed
thus far. His statement seems to imply that the concept o f wrong or sinful in the minds of
some is disputed ground as a justification for constraint. Justice Burger further speaks o f
a morally neutral judgment, Morally neutral in what sense? I believe he is expressing the
principle o f state neutrality on conceptions o f the good. Instead o f defending a particular
conception o f right or wrong, he justifies obscenity law based upon the harm principle.
Behavior may be constrained if it is deemed injurious to the community and may
endanger public safety.
Justice Douglas, once again writing in dissent, affirms the liberal principle of
individual autonomy in all matters of opinion and conscience:
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When man was first in the jungle he took care o f himself. When he
entered a societal group, controls were necessarily imposed. But our
society, unlike most in the world - presupposes that freedom and liberty
are a frame of reference that makes the individual, not the government, the
keeper o f the tastes, beliefs, and ideas. That is the philosophy o f the First
Amendment; it is the article o f faith that sets us apart from most nations in
the world (Paris 73).
His basic argument is twofold: (1) there is no clear, consensual conception defining
obscenity, and (2) obscenity laws are arbitrary encroachments on free speech and
thought; therefore, there is “no definable class of sexually oriented expression that may
be totally suppressed by the Federal and State Government (Paris 103).”
It is consistent with the decisions of the judges in the court cases I considered to
conclude that moral-political discourse in America excludes explicit religious convictions
as the sole justification for coercive law. The justification for obscenity laws, without
exception, appealed to the concept of a “public harm” and a “community moral
consensus” independent o f religious based moral-premises. Now comes the difficulty,
for some citizens, an understanding o f public harm and community moral consensus may
very well be closely tied to religious convictions. Separating religious convictions from
secular convictions may be impossible; and, even if this separation could be
accomplished, should this be a requirement of voting citizens in a liberal democracy?
The proper role of religious convictions in moral-political discourse is not so easily
settled; I believe current political-culture reflects disagreement rather than unanimity.

Conclusion
It is time to draw some conclusions concerning the proper role of religious convictions
as a justification for coercive laws in American society. The issue I have raised reflects
several areas o f disagreement in American culture as follows: (1) there is disagreement
on if and how religious convictions should enter the arena o f public debate and
justification for law; (2) The Enlightenment goal o f establishing a conclusive rational
foundation for morality apart from an appeal to higher authority is far from resolved for
many American citizens; (3) citizens, philosophers, politicians, and judges disagree on
the meaning and application o f Mill’s harm principle to law; (4) contemporary American
social and political culture maintains a high commitment to individual freedom and a
wariness o f any state or majoritarian violation o f autonomy, still, there is an unresolved
tension between individual rights and community interests
I conclude with an assertion made by' Alisdair MacIntyre: laws reveal conflicts in
society and are indicative o f unresolved and conflicted interests rather than an expression
o f commonly shared values and beliefs. He argues that the “function o f the Supreme
Court must be to keep peace between rival social groups adhering to rival and
incompatible principles o f justice by displaying a fairness which consists in evenhandedness in its adjudications (253).” He further states, “The nature o f any society... is
not deciphered from its laws alone, but from those understood as an index o f its conflicts
(254). Academic debate, public discourse, public policy makers, and judges will
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continue to grapple with the complex relationship between church and state, specifically,
the proper role o f religious conviction in shaping and informing individual choices and
public policy as it pertains to coercive laws. America continues to be a nation in which a
■ j 'j

great number of its citizens express a belief in God and maintain that the great ethical
question, how should we order our lives together, cannot be divorced from a belief in
“divine truth,” although there is a reticence to imposing such beliefs on other citizens by
force o f law. At the same time, there remains a strong “secular” current in society that
defends a strong separation between church and state and maintains that public debate
and public polity should exclude, as a general principle, religious belief and conviction.
Religion should be regulated to private life and practice. In a liberal democracy that
attempts (certainly imperfectly) to give each citizen a voice, a policy o f compromise
between the more radical positions on this issue is the most likely outcome. Citizens with
strong religious convictions about the way life should be ordered in our society will
continue a heated debate with those citizens who hold strong secular convictions about
the way life should be ordered. Each will claim victim status and appeal to the courts to
resolve complicated issues involving church and state relationships. I believe the courts
will remain busy interpreting and applying the religious clauses of the First Amendment
to issues of contemporary public debate.

22 Alan Wolfe in his essay, Civil Religion Revisited: Quiet Faith in Middle-Class America, comments that
although 94 percent o f Americans express a belief in God, they are reticent to impose their own beliefs
about right and wrong on others. Tolerance o f other points o f view is a commonly embraced value in
middle-class America (57). Wolfe is Professor o f Sociology and political-Science at Boston University.
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